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Peter Muntigl, Simon Fraser University 
Whether one agrees with the principles, methods or aims of CDA or not, one can surely 
not accuse CDA as having generated indifference within the linguistic and discourse 
analytic community. In fact, much CDA research has been very effective in promoting 
discussion and controversy over a number of social and methodological issues. CDA’s 
focus on the discursive construction of social identities, power, ideology and domina-
tion, for example, has promoted a range of debates on exogenous vs. endogenous inter-
pretations of social context (see Schegloff: 1997) and on the rhetorical and ideological 
underpinnings of various approaches to discourse analysis (see Wetherell: 1998; Billig: 
1999). 
More recently, CDA has been criticized on the grounds that it lacks a cognitive di-
mension in which human social action and/or social discourse may be better explained.1
This view, promulgated by Chilton (2005), argues that the kinds of ‘critical’ analyses 
performed by CDA practitioners are inadequate in that they do not consider the workings 
of the human mind and the kinds of mental representations and processes contained 
therein. Chilton claims that without taking a cognitive linguistic perspective on discur-
sive action, the analyst is predestined to providing a mere description of discourse and 
cannot hope to properly ‘explain’ how people think and understand or how ideologies, 
social identities or racist attitudes arise and get propagated. But even worse, Chilton 
suggests that CDA will most likely not be able to fulfill one of its ultimate aims, which 
is to combat inequality and oppression. 
Chilton’s turn to cognitivism has a seductive appeal, especially in an age where lin-
guists are becoming increasingly interested in neurological/cerebral activity and what 
that can say about linguistic competence. Commonsense reasoning seems to be dictating 
that since ‘brains’ are obviously playing an enabling role in having us hear, speak, un-
derstand, etc., the mysteries of human nature, human sociality and human language must 
be locked up in there somewhere. I would argue, however, that the move to embrace 
cognitivism contains a number of potential pitfalls: First, it leads to an individualistic 
view in which ‘meanings’ are housed exclusively within minds or brains; Second, and 
related to the first, it tends to disregard the interactive and historical process by which 
people construct and negotiate meaning. As a third and last point, political action be-
comes construed simply as an innate capacity, as a brain module rather than as being 
linked to sets of interpersonal spaces in which conflicting human interests are fought 
over and negotiated.  
For the rest of this paper, I will begin by briefly outlining some of Chilton’s argu-
ments for adopting a cognitive linguistic view. Following that, I will point out some of 
the weaknesses of cognitive science models of meaning and argue that a combinatory 
approach, one that takes account of both conceptual and interpersonal meaning would 
better serve the interests of discourse analysis in general and CDA in particular. 

1  A notable exception is Teun van Dijk’s work on cognition. 
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1. Chilton’s Arguments for why CDA needs to Consider Mind 
CDA has been described as an “engaged and committed” social scientific approach to 
discourse that seeks to address social problems by rendering visible opaque aspects of 
social life such as unequal power relations, oppression, racism, sexism and ideologies 
(Fairclough & Wodak: 1997). By avowing their commitment to social problems, CDA 
practitioners do not merely content themselves with describing the mechanisms underly-
ing oppression, racism, etc. Their goal is also one of active engagement in which social 
problems may become alleviated or even effaced. Another central CDA tenet is that dis-
course is a form of social action (Fairclough & Wodak: 1997, 279). Further, all forms of 
social relations that include aspects of power, ideology, racism, oppression, etc. are seen 
as discursively constituted. 
Chilton has taken issue with CDA in a number of respects, including how discourse is 
characterized and how CDA may achieve emancipatory effects. At the root of CDA’s 
troubles, Chilton notes that in most characterizations of CDA there is no mention of the 
human mind and how it relates to discourse. He views this omission as a major theoreti-
cal deficiency. Most of Chilton’s arguments are drawn from work being done in cogni-
tive science and cognitive linguistics. Simplifying greatly, cognitive science perspectives 
view the mind as a central processor and organizer of meaning. When we use language, 
our brains become engaged in various types of mental or conceptual activities. Chilton 
discusses two general areas of cognitive research: The first concerns the modularity of 
mind and the second, conceptual blending or integration. Taking modularity first, Fodor 
(1983) claims that brains have different modules for doing different kinds of tasks such 
as recognizing faces, space, colour, voices, etc. and that these modules provide input to a 
central processing system within the brain. This general concept of modularity has been 
avidly taken up by ‘theory of mind’ researchers (see, for example, Astington & Baird: 
2005). What these researchers propose is that we have an innate ability to read other 
people’s intentions and thus are able to predict others’ future actions. This ability or 
module also enables what has been termed Machiavellian Intelligence. Because we are 
able to predict the intentions of others and because we can recognize how others are rec-
ognizing our own intentions, we may engage in tactical deception; that is, we may ‘fool’ 
others by ‘pretending’ to have a certain intention when we ‘really’ have a different one. 
According to Chilton, modularity is a concept that CDA theorists must somehow en-
gage with. Machiavellian intelligence, for example, is (innate) political behaviour and is 
not derived from socialization as CDA would claim. Chilton (2005, 30) thus comes to 
the general conclusion that “if the field is to take account of all relevant science, then it 
seems inevitable that it has to confront the question of how the human mind works when 
engaged in social and political action, which is largely, for humans, verbal action.” But 
even more damaging for CDA is Chilton’s claim that the findings of cognitive science 
may render the critical analyses characteristic of CDA unnecessary: 
If individual humans are innately machiavellian, they are also innately able to counter one 
another’s machinations. If language is crucial to this ability and associated activity, then 
they should have an innate ability not just to use language in machiavellian ways but to de-
tect and counter one another’s machiavellian use of language. […] In the meantime, the 
question is, given the foregoing remarks: What is CDA for if people can do it anyway? 
(Chilton: 2005, 31) 
In Chilton’s view, CDA has done a fine descriptive job of identifying the discursive con-
struction of attitudes, stereo-typing categorizations, mitigation devices of ‘apparent de-
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nial’, etc. (Chilton: 2005, 24). What is lacking, however, is an explanatory account of 
why phenomena such as racism, oppression, sexism, etc. continue to be omnipresent in 
our society despite critical analysts’ vigilant efforts at combating these tendencies. 
The disturbing fact is that racism, xenophobia and other kinds of exclusionary behaviour 
continue to appear. This suggests that we may need to delve deeper into why this kind of 
category formation is so persistent a factor in social behaviour, and why the language forms 
associated with it are so potent. […] This means that taking an explanatory stance rather 
than a merely descriptive one and it also means, I am suggesting, taking account of ideas 
developed in cognitive and evolutionary psychology. (Chilton: 2005, 24) 
One aspect of Chilton’s answer to these problems is to consider the range of cognitive 
work being done on the modularity of mind because it can provide an explanation of the 
genesis and evolution of social problems such as racism. Mithen’s (1996) concept of 
cognitive fluidity, for example, provides an explanation for how racism evolved through 
the integration of two modules involving technical and social intelligence. Initially, so-
called early humans contained separate modules for manipulating objects (technical in-
telligence) and for thinking about people (social intelligence). As the brain evolved, so 
the story goes, humans were able to combine these modules and in that way begin to 
think about people as objects to be manipulated and to perceive certain groups of people 
as inferior. 
An even more sophisticated treatment of how people create meanings through differ-
ent modules or input spaces by creating analogies, identity relations, contrasts, etc. is 
found in the work of Fauconnier & Turner (2002). What they call conceptual blending
is, according to Chilton (2005, 31), an important contribution to helping us understand 
“what the mind is doing when it does racist discourse.” Two important concepts include 
conceptual integration and mental spaces, which are defined below: 
Conceptual integration is at the heart of imagination. It connects input spaces, projects selec-
tively to a blended space, and develops emergent structure through composition, completion 
and elaboration in the blend. (Fauconnier & Turner: 2002, 89) 
Mental spaces are small conceptual packets constructed as we think and talk, for purposes of 
local understanding and action. They are very partial assemblies containing elements, struc-
tured by frames and cognitive models. (Fauconnier & Turner: 2002, 102) 
In conceptual integration, a standard blend is created by integrating meanings from two 
input spaces (also mental spaces).2 Chilton gives the example involving nazi anti-
Semitic propaganda. He shows how a conceptual blend that viewed Jews as parasites 
(and that acted to justify the heinous act of murder) was made possible through two input 
spaces. One space contained a medical/biological frame of parasitology and the other 
space contained a cultural/nationalist/migratory frame. 
Input Space 1: Medical/Biological Frame of Parasitology 
Hosts/ Parasites: Parasites are contained within (i.e., infect) hosts; Parasites are extermi-
nated via medicine. 
Input Space 2: Cultural/Nationalist/Migratory Frame 
Nation/ Subgroup: Subgroup (Jews) has migrated into a (German) nation. 

2  A fourth space, termed a generic space, also forms an integral part of the model. But due to space restric-
tions, I have not included this in the analysis. 
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In the blended space, these two inputs spaces are integrated, allowing for nations to be 
thought of as hosts and subgroups (i.e., Jews) to be thought of as parasites. 
Blended Space 
Host=Nation; Parasite=Subgroup: Subgroup (Jews) has invaded (i.e., infected) the 
(German) nation; Subgroup needs to be exterminated. 
Thus, through the creation of this blend, Nazis were not only able to conceptualize 
Jews in a highly offensive way, but it also helped them to justify their horrendous crime 
against humanity (a much more detailed analysis of this blend is found in Chilton: 2005, 
38-41). 
Conceptual blending is a theory of what the mind is doing when it ‘thinks’ or proc-
esses discourse. Chilton (2005, 46) argues that, although the theory has limited practical 
value (it is of little use in combating racism), it has the potential of deepening our under-
standing of how concepts emerge: “If it has any value it is of a scientific kind, in so far 
as it sketches a hypothesis as to how certain conceptual structures take hold of the mind 
and spread.” 
To sum up, Chilton proposes the following advantages to incorporating a cognitive 
science model of mind in one’s theory and analysis: 
1. It allows us to explain rather than merely describe social action and thinking 
and how such thinking and action has evolved; 
2. It shows the actual process of thinking (i.e., cognitive fluidity, conceptual inte-
gration); 
3. It allows us to go ‘deeper’ than merely identifying speakers’ discourse prac-
tices; speakers are experts in this domain anyway (i.e., people are doing it with-
out the help of discourse analysts) so there is limited benefit to studying social 
interaction. 
I will argue, however, that the tenets of cognitive science approaches, if taken as the
framework for understanding how people make meaning, essentially lead to an individu-
alistic, non-social view of discourse. A predominant focus on ‘mind’ and the mental 
representations that minds contain and construct (e.g., blends, scripts, schemas, frames, 
etc.), without taking into account how people interact, implies that ‘meaning’ is largely 
an internal construct and process and is only peripherally dependant (if at all) on what 
people say to each other in specific settings. 
In the cognitive science view, communication is often equated with the mind’s prob-
lem solving abilities. Understanding is seen as the mind’s skill at reading others’ inten-
tions (or others’ masking of their intentions) or at construing counterfactuality, riddles, 
similarities, analogies, contrasts, temporal and spatial relations, etc. Very little relevance 
is given to the contextual situation and to how meaning is a collaborative process involv-
ing more than one person (i.e., ‘mind’). In fact, it is ‘minds’ or ‘brains’ that are seen as 
understanding and constructing meaning but not people. This kind of reductionism al-
lows us to think of communication as something that happens between brains (much as 
an information transfer process occurring between computers) rather than as something 
that happens between people who are embedded in a historically and locally constituted 
social world and who actively take part in negotiating meaning. 
In Blending Theory, it would appear that we first form mental constructs about phe-
nomena (objects, people, groups, counterfactual situations, etc.) and then, as a result of 
having formed these constructs, we are somehow moved to action. But why separate 
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‘thought’ and ‘action’ in this way? For example, do we first construe a person or group 
as inferior (or a parasite) and then do something? Or, by contrast, do our dealings with 
others have us also construct feelings of fear, hatred, jealously, etc., which leads us to 
form negative attitudes? Or is it not a matter of one causing the other (e.g., a thought 
leads to action), but of both arising in tandem? 
2. Thought, Action & Mind 
What is thinking? The answer from cognitive linguists such as Fauconnier & Turner is 
that it relates to a complex process termed conceptual blending in which human brains 
integrate mental spaces, thereby creating emergent cognitive structures. This view pro-
poses to explain what is going on inside our heads, but on what grounds? If one looks 
closely at Fauconnier & Turner’s book, you rarely find ‘real’ texts that involve people 
actually communicating with each other. Mostly, we are presented with a situation (or 
phrase/ sentence) and then are told what is going on in the mind for that situation. 
Ethnomethodologists such as Jeff Coulter have for some years now been problematiz-
ing the concept of ‘mind’ and its underlying assumptions. Coulter has argued that al-
though cognitive scientists tend to equate ‘thinking’ with a concrete activity such as ‘di-
gesting’, he notes that an examination of its grammatical properties reveals something 
different. 
‘Thinking’, however, is a polymorph and is not the name for a particular, identifiable proc-
ess with specific ingredients, such as, e.g., masticating or digesting. I can, for example, on 
the basis of my words/deeds, be correctly said to “think that it is Tuesday” (when it is in fact 
Wednesday) without my ever having entertained such a discursive expression to myself. 
Note as well that, context apart, being informed simply that someone is “thinking” does not 
yet specify what he is doing: he may be trying to recall where he left his cigarettes or how to 
spell a word, figuring out his tax bill, wondering if it will rain, and a myriad of other possi-
bilities. (Coulter: 1999, 174) 
If we look more closely at the grammar, we may take note that the preferred construal of 
‘to think’ in cognitive science is “think about” rather than “think that”. Although the 
former refers to an activity, the latter construes a state and behaves more like the verbs 
‘be’ or ‘have’. For example, we tend to say “I think that Fauconnier & Turner are cogni-
tive linguists” rather than “*I am thinking that Fauconnier & Turner are cognitive lin-
guists.” A comprehensive treatment of the semantics of ‘to think’, therefore, should con-
sider all aspects of the term’s meaning and not only selected ones. 
But even apart from this point, Coulter is asserting that the ‘activity’ being repre-
sented by ‘thinking’ is opaque rather than uniquely specifiable or inferable as a certain 
operation occurring in the mind. Consider example (1), taken from a couples therapy 
session involving a therapist and her client Dave. 
01 Ther: how how are you feeling Dave? 
02 Dave: I’m just thinking about everything 
What activity is ‘thinking’ referring to in Dave’s response? The pronoun “everything” 
renders the scope of Dave’s thinking excessively broad and, therefore, unidentifiable. 
So, we cannot know what Dave is thinking and the specific wording of his response 
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seems to act as a shield against the therapist’s ability to gain any insight in this matter. 
But even if Dave had specified the scope of his thinking with something like “I’m just 
thinking about how sad I’ve become”, can we now say with more precision what exact 
process is being referred to by Dave’s “thinking”? It appears that we cannot and perhaps 
for this reason, cognitive linguists are eager to delve behind the scene or into the per-
son’s mind to get some answers. We could say, for instance, that Dave had just been 
‘thinking’ about various events and that this led him to reveal his thoughts. Thus, we 
generate a thought, a mental representation, a conceptual blend, whatever, and this can 
cause us to express our thought: ‘I’m thinking about being sad’ [internalized thought] 
which leads Dave to say “I’m thinking about being sad” or even just “I’m sad”. Coulter, 
however, warns us about drawing such conclusions. 
But much of what I do, I do non-ratiocinatively, without prior reflection, although not there-
by ‘thoughtlessly’, and on those occasions when it generally makes sense to say that the way 
he or she thought about something was related to what he or she subsequently did or said, 
the connection is not necessarily (nor even empirically generally) one of a prior action guid-
ing a consequent one. (Coulter: 1999, 174) 
What this implies is that to understand how communication works, we need not posit a 
‘mental device’ that transforms thoughts into utterances (or vice versa). But, we may 
then ask, how do we access the thoughts of others and understand what others mean? Is 
it through a theory of mind module that we are able to read off others’ meanings and 
intentions? If so, what part does language play in this process? The route to take for 
Coulter and other researchers working in the areas of ethnomethodology (Leudar & Cos-
tall: 2009), conversation analysis (Schegloff: 1997) and discursive psychology (Edwards 
& Potter: 1992) is first to adopt an action-oriented view of meaning: Our understanding 
of others’ meanings and intentions is not achieved by somehow gaining access to inter-
nalized representations (or thoughts or conceptual blends, etc.), but by attending to oth-
ers’ social actions that are embedded within social contexts. It is what people do and say 
in recognizable social settings that allows us to ‘know’ what someone meant and make 
inferences about their intentions. Furthermore, in the medium of conversation, we are 
constantly, on a moment-by-moment basis, displaying our understanding of others’ 
meanings. It is by monitoring others’ behaviour and by engaging with others in interac-
tion that we come to understandings. Even if brains are somehow involved, it is people
that are doing it not brains. 
It is in and through the exhibited conduct toward or with the object that one can tell in what 
way it was ‘thought about’, only if ‘thought about’ is here taken to mean something like: 
‘construed’, ‘understood’, etc., and not as signifying a prior spate of reflection or interpreta-
tion. The conduct-with-the-object, in other words, displays the way(s) in which the object 
was construed. Invoking the expression ‘thinks about’ here only misleads us into falsely 
postulating antecedent, undisclosed ‘thoughts’ as omnirelevant in understanding conduct. 
(Coulter: 1999, 174) 
3. Conceptual AND Empirical Analysis 
Fauconnier & Turner’s (2002) theory of conceptual blending is basically ‘experiential’ 
in scope. By experiential, I mean that it focuses mainly on the representation of experi-
ence and events (see Halliday 1994 for a discussion of experiential meaning). But, as 
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Halliday (1978) has pointed out, language also contains an interpersonal component, for 
interacting with others, that is just as relevant as the experiential component. In this way, 
people do not make meaning solely by integrating different mental spaces (e.g., constru-
ing analogies, identities, contrasts, temporal/spatial relations, etc.), they also create in-
terpersonal relations by asking questions, making requests, having arguments, displaying 
emotions, downplaying their interests, modulating threats to own and others’ face, etc. 
Language is put to use to perform a range of rhetorical and interactional business (Ed-
wards & Potter: 1992) and so restricting one’s focus on ‘conceptualizations’ will fail to 
take account of the ‘bigger’ picture of how meaning is made and negotiated. Along simi-
lar lines, Coulter (1989, 1999) makes a plea for performing both a conceptual and em-
pirical analysis of discourse. The former proposes an analysis along the lines of Witt-
genstein (1958) and Ryle (1949) in which we look to the grammar to understand what 
concepts mean; the latter relates to an ‘ethnomethodological’ analysis (Garfinkel: 1967) 
in which accountable conduct (and speakers’ practices for organizing this conduct) be 
examined within naturally occurring social settings. 
To give an example of how interpersonal meaning and not just conceptualization is 
important for understanding social interaction, consider example (2) taken from a cou-
ples therapy session involving a therapist, Dave and Lisa.3
(2) 23:6 [19:28] 
 01 Ther: what are you lau:ghing abou:t. 
 02 Lisa: I’m laughing about myse:lf. 
 03  (1.6) 
 04 Lisa: hhhhhhh. 
 05  (2.7) 
 06 Ther:  about yourself? 
 07 Lisa: tch u:m. (0.3) I’m just- oh I might as well just ask Dave when my  
 08  birthday party is going to be:. cuz I’ve been waiting for it. 
 09  (3.5) 
 10 Dave: its gonna be the Sunday at my parents house. 
 11 Lisa: I thought you work Sunday. 
 12  (1.8) 
 13 Dave: well its gonna be after I get off of work. 
This conversation contains a few examples of what Fauconnier & Turner would call 
implicit counterfactuals. These are expressions that are contrary to ‘reality’ and include 
“when my birthday party is going to be:. cuz I’ve been waiting for it” and “I thought you 
work Sunday”: For the first example Lisa expresses a wish to have a birthday party and, 
for the second, she expresses a claim that is paraphrasable as something like “If you 
work Sunday, you won’t be able to organize my birthday party”. Fauconnier & Turner 
argue that counterfactuals are all-pervasive and are able to set up complex conceptual 
blends that prompt a range of thoughts, scenarios and inferences. 
Let us attempt to construct a blend for the first counterfactual. As input spaces, we 
might have one space in which Dave organizes a birthday party for Lisa (and, by impli-
cation, Lisa feels appreciated through Dave’s action) and, for the second she waits for 

3  The transcription notation is derived from Atkinson & Heritage (1984: ix-xiv): ‘Underline’ = ‘emphasis’; 
‘:’ = ‘sound extension’; ‘(1.6)’ = ‘pause recorded in seconds’; ‘hhhh’ = ‘outbreath’. 
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but does not have a birthday party. As a result of blending these two spaces, we may 
have something like ‘Lisa’s waiting for Dave to organize a birthday party for her leads 
her not to feel appreciated’. Now, although this seems a plausible analysis for what Lisa 
meant (and how Dave and ‘we’ as analysts may understand Lisa’s utterance), there most 
likely are many other ways to construct a blend for Lisa’s utterance. In fact, my analysis 
was based largely on my knowledge of the sessions prior to this in which Dave’s ‘lack of 
appreciation of Lisa’s wants and needs’ was identified as a problem. Without having this 
privileged knowledge, it might have been inferred instead that Lisa is simply becoming a 
bit impatient with Dave and that it is not all that important to her anyway. 
But an even larger point is that if the conceptual blend is supposed to represent what 
Lisa (and more importantly Dave, since he is the target of Lisa’s utterance) is thinking, 
then the ensuing conversation should provide some clues. But Dave’s response of “its 
gonna be the Sunday at my parents house” merely addresses the “when” of Lisa’s prior 
turn. Now of course, the point is also that Dave is ignoring, and perhaps even resisting, 
Lisa’s complaint, but do we know that Dave was indeed thinking in terms of the blend? 
It appears that conceptual blending is a theory about how speakers can ‘mean’ much 
more than they ‘say’ and offers many possibilities that extend far beyond Grice. But we 
still need to examine the interactional context to check whether the blends that we are 
proposing are warrantable and in some oriented to by the speakers. 
As a last point, the conceptual or experiential meaning behind Lisa’s utterance seems 
only to scratch the surface in explaining this interaction. For example, it was mentioned 
before that Lisa’s turn functions to complain, but there is more; she also designs her turn 
to ward off the implication that she has too much stake in her complaint (i.e., that she is 
a constant ‘nag’). The preface, I’m just- oh I might as well just ask…, mitigates her in-
vestment in the complaint by making it appear that she had, just at that moment, become 
aware of Dave’s lack of effort in organizing a party (for a discussion of stake & interest
and how speakers inoculate against stake, see Edwards & Potter: 1992). 
To conclude, it would appear that if blending theory stays purely at the conceptual 
level of thought and action, it will remain a ‘partial’ theory that neglects the interper-
sonal domain. But even worse, in its present state it is mainly an academic exercise in 
which we theorize about what people mean based on mental space models. Empiri-
cal/interpersonal analysis is needed to ground any proposals of how people construe 
events in how they display their understandings. 
4. Conclusions 
Although cognitive science and cognitive linguistic approaches to discourse offer important 
insights pertaining to the experiential realm of meaning, it has very little to say about how 
meaning is negotiated in different social and political spheres. The proposal, then, to offer 
up cognitive linguistics as a panacea to the ills of critical discourse analysis seems far-
fetched, to say the least. The discourse-historical approach exercised by Wodak and her 
colleagues (e.g., Muntigl, Weiss & Wodak: 2000; Wodak: 1996; Wodak, Nowak, Pelikan, 
Gruber, de Cillia & Mitten: 1990) is, in my opinion, much more effective in mapping out 
the genesis of social and political events and the social problems that result. Doing this form 
of analysis is much more than mere ‘description’; it helps to explain how certain practices 
(institutional, professional, etc.) have unique (and sometimes undesirable) social outcomes. 
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It may be that CDA needs to add more conceptual analysis to its investigations. But 
this should not be viewed as a trade-off, as doing more conceptual analysis and less em-
pirical. If it is to become innovative, it should develop into a complementary approach 
that keeps the social, interactional construction of meaning at centre stage. 
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